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This paper examines the recent decentralization of governance in Indonesia and its impact on local 
infrastructure provision. The decentralization of decisionmaking power to local jurisdictions in Indonesia 
may have improved the matching of public infrastructures provision with local preferences. However, 
decentralization has made local public infrastructures depend on local resources. Due to differences in 
initial endowments, this may result in the divergence of local public infrastructures in rich and poor 
jurisdictions. Using data from village-level panel surveys conducted in 1996, 2000, and 2006, this paper 
finds that (1) local public infrastructures depend on local resources, (2) decentralization has improved the 
availability of local public infrastructures, (3) local jurisdictions are converging to a similar level of local 
public infrastructure, and (4) to some extent, decentralized public infrastructures’ provision reflects local 
preferences. 






1.  INTRODUCTION 
Decentralization refers to the devolution of decisionmaking power on local policies to the elected local-
level authorities of the relevant localities. With the fall of planned economies and centralized states, the 
decentralization of governance and the delivery of public goods by local authorities have taken center 
stage in many of the policy experiments favored by development agencies and donor communities (World 
Bank 1999). Following an economic and financial crisis, Indonesia embarked on the path to 
decentralization in the late 1990s. In this paper, we examine whether the decentralized provision of public 
goods in Indonesia reflects local preferences, and whether public goods provision differs between rich 
and poor localities.  
Decentralized services can be a means of achieving allocatable efficiency because the provided 
goods can better reflect the preferences of the service users, while service costs can be reflected in a user 
fee for such services. Under the assumption of uniform expenditure, Oates (1972) found that 
decentralization is preferable to centralized provision, given heterogeneous tastes and no spillovers, since 
local governments can tailor local public goods to local tastes. In contrast, when spillovers are present and 
there is no heterogeneity in taste, centralized provision is more efficient.
1
Decentralized services can also be a means of achieving productive efficiency.
 This is usually referred to as the 
“preference-matching hypothesis.”  
2
In this paper, we use village-level panel data to test the preference-matching and divergence 
hypotheses in the context of Indonesian decentralization. We test the hypotheses by asking two questions: 
first, has the decentralized provision of public infrastructures reflected local preferences? Since the 
provided public infrastructures are chosen at the local level under decentralization, the preference-
matching hypothesis indicates that such provision should reflect the needs and preferences of the local 
citizens. Second, has decentralization led to divergence in the amount of local infrastructures available in 
rich versus poor localities? Under decentralization, investment in local public infrastructures depends 
largely on local resources. The divergence hypothesis predicts that differences in local resource 
endowments across localities may lead to differences in public infrastructure investment.  
 Seabright (1996) 
and Persson and Tabellini (2000) show that under certain conditions, decentralization can improve 
productive efficiency by reducing corruption, waste, and public fund leakage. Bardhan and Mookherjee 
(2000, 2005, 2006) emphasized the limited accountability of bureaucrats under centralized systems and 
the possibility of elite capture under decentralized systems. Under the assumption that public goods could 
be pro-poor or pro-rich, the authors focused on the efficiency and equity of public goods provision under 
alternate financing arrangements. They found that decentralization, accompanied by local-level financing, 
makes local public goods dependent on local resource availability, leading to the possibility of divergence 
in the amount of local public good available in rich versus poor localities. This is referred to as the 
“divergence hypothesis.” 
Three distinct characteristics make Indonesia an attractive test case for examining the two 
research questions at hand: (1) the relative exogeneity of the decentralization experiment; (2) large 
variations in the availability of resources among local government jurisdictions; and (3) the availability of 
both pre- and post-decentralization data on local public infrastructures (discussed in more detail in 
Section 4).  
In Indonesia, the decision to decentralize was exogenous to the local authorities, and the 
implementation of decentralization was relatively quick; rather than employing gradualism, the 
decisionmakers used a “big bang” approach. The reform agenda, which was formulated by multilateral 
                                                       
1 Subsequent political economy models, such as those of Lockwood (2002) and Besley and Coate (2003), relaxed the 
assumption of uniform provision under a centralized system, and modeled public spending under centralization as being 
determined by a legislature of locally elected representatives. These studies showed that preference matching is reduced under 
centralization, even when regional delegates represent the interests of the voters in their electing regions. 




donors and development agencies following the Asian financial crisis, paved the devolution of fiscal and 
political authority from the central government down to the districts.
3
Large variations in initial local resource availability/potential among local government 
jurisdictions, along with incomplete fiscal equalization transfer, also contribute to making Indonesia an 
attractive test case for the current research. In 2000, prior to the implementation of decentralization, the 
per capita income in the top 20 percent of the districts was three times more than that in the bottom 20 
percent of the districts. Similarly, the poverty rates differed significantly among local jurisdictions.
  
4
Our work complements the theoretical literature on preference matching (Oates 1972 and 
subsequent papers) as well as the growing body of theoretical literature that focuses on the links among 
decentralization, accountability, elite capture, and the welfare of the poor (see, for instance, Bardhan and 
Mookherjee [2006] and references therein). Although early theoretical studies on these matters 
emphasized the trade-off between the uniformity of service delivery under centralization versus issues of 
uneconomic scale and cross-regional externalities under decentralization, more recent studies have 
emphasized the limited accountability of local government officials, and the risk of capture by local elites 
and interest groups. There is currently an ongoing debate regarding the relative responsiveness of 
centralized versus decentralized delivery of public goods. Here, we seek to test this empirically.  
 
Although a conditional intergovernmental transfer program based on the fiscal needs was formulated to 
address these differences, fiscal equalization was incomplete and fiscal disparities persist among the local 
government jurisdictions. Even with the equalization transfers, the richest district has roughly 70 times 
more per capita revenue than the poorest district (Eckardt and Shah 2006).  
The existing empirical studies on decentralization primarily examine the issue at the cross-
national level (for example, Estache 1995; Huther and Shah 1998; Fishman and Gati 2001; Mello and 
Barenstein 2001; Treisman 2002; Khaleghain 2003), where decentralization is usually measured by the 
percentage of government expenditure or the taxes collected at the subnational level.
5
Three previous empirical works bear some resemblance to the present study. First, Foster and 
Rosenzweig (2001) examined how democratization affected the interests of the poor in India. Second, 
Faguet (2004) examined how decentralization increased preference matching in local communities in 
Bolivia; however, local spending was entirely grant-financed and decentralization was accompanied with 
redistribution in this case, and these issues were not separated for analysis. Finally, Barankay and 
Lockwood (2007) reported on the productive efficiency associated with decentralization in the context of 
education provision in Swiss cantons.  
 However, given 
that there is substantial heterogeneity in the decentralization frameworks seen across various countries, 
the use of these measures as proxies of decentralization may not be accurate. Similarly, the commonly 
used outcome measures, such as corruption or immunization, may not reflect the true outcomes of 
decentralization processes. Fortunately, recent decentralizations in Indonesia and other developing 
countries can bring useful and complementary evidence utilizing within-country variations.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides a brief description of the 
decentralization process in Indonesia. Section 3 describes the empirical approach, which maps initial local 
incomes and preferences to subsequent allocations for local public goods during the pre- and post-
decentralization periods, then estimates growth equations that characterize changes in infrastructure as 
conditional on its initial-stage availability. Section 4 describes the data used to construct the village-level 
panels for the two periods (pre- and post-decentralization). Section 5 describes our empirical results on 
the impact of local incomes and preferences on public goods provision during the pre- and post-
decentralization periods. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of some possible policy implications. 
 
                                                       
3 Through the enactment of Law 22/1999 on regional governance, the responsibility for many government expenditures was 
decentralized to the local (district) governments. 
4 The poverty figures for the top and bottom quintiles of the districts in 1999 were 8.53 percent and 43.07 percent, 
respectively. Authors’ calculation is based on Bureau Pusat Statistics (BPS) data. 
5 Both Faguet (2004) and Barankay and Lockwood (2007) provide summaries of recent empirical studies, highlighting their 




2.  DECENTRALIZATION IN INDONESIA 
Indonesia is comprised of 33 provinces, which are divided into districts (kabupaten) and cities. The 
districts are divided into subdistricts, which are further divided into villages (desa). The recent 
decentralization entrusted the kabupaten and desa with the responsibility of providing public goods. Both 
district and village heads are elected by popular vote, while each subdistrict (kecamatan) is headed by a 
civil servant who reports to the district head.  
From the Dutch colonial era until decentralization, Indonesia was governed by a centralized 
system in which the local governments mostly functioned to implement policies and programs that were 
designed by the central government. In 1999, however, immediately after the financial crisis, the 
government embarked on a drastic reform path, devolving the responsibility for many government 
expenditures to the district governments through fiscal and political decentralization. This process 
endowed the district governments with additional fiscal resources, human resources, authorities, and 
responsibilities. The transition was implemented in 2001 under tight deadlines.
6
Two of the main cornerstones of Indonesian decentralization were Law 22/1999 on governance 
and Law 25/1999 on fiscal relations. Law 22 devolved all governance functions from the central 
government to the local authorities, with the exceptions of national defense, international relations, 
justice, police, monetary policy, development planning, religion, and finance. Law 22 also made the local 
governments responsible for the provision of healthcare, education, and environmental and infrastructure 
services. The local governments were also given leeway to perform any other function not explicitly 
reserved for the central government.  
  
Similarly, but in the context of fiscal relations, Law 25 significantly strengthened the local 
governments’ shares in government spending. For example, the expenditure share of regional 
governments in overall public expenditures increased from about 17 percent in 2000 to over 30 percent 
after 2001. In addition, decentralization also reassigned approximately two-thirds of the central 
governments’ civil servants to the local governments. Presently, local governments employ over three-
quarters of the civil servants in Indonesia. 
Beginning in 1999, sweeping legislative and administrative changes in local governments brought 
momentous changes to decisions on the selection and financing of local public infrastructures and goods. 
Following the decision to decentralize, the central government quickly delegated virtually all 
responsibility for urban and rural infrastructure services to the local governments (Peterson and Muzzini 
2005). In 2002, local governments financed 44.3 percent of transportation development, 21 percent of 
healthcare and social services, and 16 percent of education development (Eckardt and Shah 2006). 
Needless to say, transportation infrastructure, healthcare, and education together constitute the major 
expenditure outlay for local governments.  
At the local level (desa), which is the focus of our empirical analysis, local public goods are 
planned for and provided as follows. Each village has an elected local government body that prepares an 
annual allocation plan of expenditures on local public goods. This plan is subject to approval at a general 
meeting attended by all members of the village. In order to finance such a plan, the village governing 
body must raise at least 30 percent of the proposed expenditure from the village residents through user’s 
fees or similar mechanisms. Once the plan and the financing methods are approved, the village governing 
body brings the proposal to the district local government. All else being equal, the higher the village-level 
financial contribution and the district-level resource availability, the higher the likelihood that the local 
public goods in question will be financed. Presently, although the central government distributes grant 
subsidies to the local governments, fiscal equalization remains incomplete. This is largely because the 
equalization formula is still driven by historical allocations (including wages), and local governments are 
subject to significant disparities in per capita expenditures (Hofman and Kaiser 2006). 
                                                       
6 By law, all implementing regulations were to be prepared within a year from approval, and the laws had to be implemented 




3.  EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
We herein follow a parametric approach that focuses on the relationship between initial village resources 
and preferences, and the subsequent stock of local public infrastructures. This approach allows us to map 
changes in local public infrastructures (for example, improvement, no change, or deterioration) with 
regard to local resource availability and preferences in the pre- versus post-decentralization periods.  
The main specification is  
  .  (1) 
The change in infrastructure stocks between the two periods in village i, ∆INFi, is defined as a categorical 
variable and is our primary variable of interest. The initial measure of local resources, INC0,i, is the initial 
period resource availability for desa i, where “0” means the initial period; this is one of the primary 
explanatory variables. We expect that its coefficient, β, will equal zero in a centralized regime and 
become positive under a (partly) user-financed decentralized regime, such as that seen in Indonesia. In 
addition, village characteristics (for example, population, the existence of a port, and topography) are 
included in Zi as further controls.  
For ∆INFi, we consider changes in three local public infrastructures. Ideally, public infrastructure 
stocks should be measured in quality-adjusted units of output. Since such information is not available for 
Indonesia, we herein examine three types of infrastructure (roads, schools, and healthcare services), 
assuming that the infrastructures are homogeneous within a particular type but heterogeneous across 
types. The first measure of local public infrastructure considered herein is a change in village roads (those 
connecting a village with the regional road network) over two time periods, one prior to decentralization 
and after decentralization. As discussed in Section 2, after the devolution of power, the financing and 
maintenance of this type of road fell under the purview of local authorities. Intuitively, we expect that rich 
villages will be likely to invest in more roads and maintain them better compared to poor villages. 
However, investment in roads could be endogenously determined, since the initial stock of village roads 
may affect the village’s current income and subsequent road investments. We account for this by 
incorporating INF0,i, which indicates the infrastructure stock for village i in period 0. The second measure 
of local public goods considered here is a change in school availability (the presence or absence of both 
primary and junior high schools in the village). We follow a specification similar to that described for the 
road measure, and we might intuitively expect that it should follow the same rationale. Finally, the third 
measure of local public goods considered herein is a change in healthcare infrastructure, namely whether 
a village possesses a polyclinic or puskesmas (community health center), which are the two types of 
primary healthcare facilities found in Indonesia.  
As noted in Section 2, the three public infrastructures considered herein (roads, healthcare 
services, and education) typically constitute the major expenditures for local governments in Indonesia. 
Here, we compare the changes in these measures between two time points within the pre-decentralization 
period (1996 and 2000) with changes occurring between two time points under decentralization (2000 and 
2006). In this way, we examine how changes between 1996–2000 and 2000–2006 are linked to local 
income and local preferences (discussed below) under the two different regimes. 
For the availability of local resources (INC), the proportion of households living in poverty is 
used as a measure of resource availability. The exact definition and construction of the variable is 
discussed further in the next section. We assume that in a user-financed decentralization program, such as 
that seen in Indonesia, the proportion of village households living in poverty determines the village’s 
aggregate ability to finance local public goods. We address the issue of endogeneity by taking lagged 
income as a control variable. 
In estimating equation (1), there are a few important issues to note. First, decentralization was 
implemented at the district level, so observed and unobserved investment behavior may differ across 
districts. For instance, richer districts had more initial resources and the transfers from the central 




To address this, we add district-fixed effects that allow us to examine how interdistrict inequality, 
including unobservables, affected public good investment behavior in both periods. Since we assume that 
investment behavior is more homogeneous within a district than across districts, we consider district-
fixed effects to be a reasonable proxy. 
Second, there may be correlation between initial village conditions and subsequent infrastructure 
investments. Although all local jurisdictions should theoretically have equal infrastructure stocks under a 
centralized regime, this was not the case in reality. Furthermore, well-endowed localities are not only 
likely to have good initial infrastructure, they were more likely to invest in new infrastructures or 
improvements in existing infrastructures. This positive correlation may create an upward bias in the 
estimated effect of initial infrastructure condition on subsequent infrastructure investments. 
Third, resource constraints and the demand for services may differ across different types of 
infrastructures and jurisdictions, and these factors can change the parameters of interest. For example, the 
demand for roads can depend on the economic activities in a given village, which is correlated with the 
initial income level and other factors. This makes it difficult to distinguish between resource constraints 
and demand heterogeneity. However, if the demand parameters are stable between the pre- and post-
decentralization periods, between-period comparison of the studied parameters should enable us to 
identify the role(s) of resource constraints (the related issues of economic and financial crisis are 
discussed later in this section). 
For the preference heterogeneity within a village (PRE), we consider the gender of the desa head, 
his/her education, age, and tenure. The usual assumption is that the preference of village heads reflects the 
voters’ preferences. This gives us the following specification: 
  .  (2) 
While specification (1) allows us to examine the impact of local income on local public goods, 
specification (2) allows us to test whether decentralized provision is responsive to local preferences.  
We examine the roles of the village head’s characteristics (age, gender, education, and tenure) 
and, in some years, the gender composition of the voters in the desa. The latter measure could correlate 
with economic activities in the desa, since migration opportunities can change the voter composition. In 
equation (2), we mitigate this potential bias by controlling for the initial income and infrastructure 
conditions.  
In addition to the issues discussed above, we must also be aware of the exogeneity of the 
community preference measure, which may be correlated with unobserved components of infrastructure 
condition. However, the above equation examines changes in infrastructures over time, not at a given time 
point, which mitigates this possibility. 
One issue not discussed so far is the macro shock of the economic crisis that took place in 1997–
1998. This major shock affected many communities and districts across all regions of Indonesia. 
Therefore, it is not unrealistic to assume that the effects of the shock were randomly distributed, and there 
is no reason to believe, a priori, that there was any systematic relationship between the shock and local 
resource availability. Even if the shock had different effects on different districts, such differences should 
not matter for our estimation, so long as they were not systematically correlated with the initial 
infrastructure conditions of the centralized regime. However, if the macro shocks and the recovery of 
public good investments were heterogeneous across districts and correlated with the initial income level, 
the macro shock could create a bias in our estimates. To solve this problem, we include district-fixed 
effects in all estimations. 
A more serious concern is the dynamic impacts of the financial crisis on infrastructure 
investments during the period of 2000–2006. The shock affected urban sectors more severely than it did 
rural sectors, meaning that villages and districts linked to urban sectors may have been adversely affected. 
This could create between-district heterogeneity in the dynamics of infrastructure investment. Although 
we cannot fully negate this issue in our framework, we assess the magnitude of this problem by including 




instead of using the district-fixed effects. This change allows us to see whether investments in local public 





4.  DATA 
The data for this study come from the Potensi Desa/Kelurahan Survey (Village Potential Statistics, 
henceforth called PODES) that is periodically conducted by Indonesia’s Central Bureau of Statistics 
(BPS).
7
We use three rounds of PODES (1996, 2000, and 2006), and match localities across the survey 
rounds for the pre- and post-decentralization periods. Since decentralization started in 2001, we use the 
first two rounds (1996 and 2000) to assess changes in public goods during the pre-decentralization period, 
and compare data from the 2000 and 2006 rounds to examine changes due to decentralization.  
 PODES contains detailed information on the public infrastructure stock in a surveyed village, 
along with the village’s characteristics, geography and topography, and the natural disaster(s) faced by the 
village in recent years.  
We match the 1996 and 2000 rounds by village (1) recovering the relevant provinces, districts, 
and subdistricts from codes that have changed from round to round and construct unique codes for the 
relevant administrative units, taking into account their mergers and splits. Since we match data based on 
village names, observations may be missed if the village name changed (for example, during a split). In 
total, nearly 84 percent of the 1996 villages match between the 1996 and 2000 datasets, and about 81 
percent of the 2,000 villages match between the 2000 and 2006 datasets.  
The datasets contain information on village roads, schools, and healthcare facilities. Village roads 
are nonexcludable and non-rival, and externalities are limited within a given village. PODES includes 
information on the type of desa road (soil, hardened, paved, and so forth; Table 1). Since we compare two 
periods (1996–2000, and 2000–2006), the combination of road variables could take 16 different states. 
However, we herein distill these combinations to three states: improvement, no change, and deterioration 
(Table 2). For the measures of school and healthcare infrastructure, we consider changes in the presence 
or absence of primary and junior high schools, and polyclinics and puskesmas, respectively.  
For estimation purposes, change in local road (deterioration [for example, from hardened road to 
soil road], no change, and improvement [for example, from soil road to paved road]) between periods is 
constructed as a categorical variable (1, 2, and 3, respectively). Similarly, between-period changes in 
education
8
Regarding the explanatory variables, villages are categorized as rich or poor based on the 
proportion of households living in poverty (pre-prosperous households and prosperous households level 
I
 and healthcare infrastructures are categorized as positive, no change, or negative (1, 2, and 3, 
respectively). This is conditioned on the initial state (at t-1 period), which appears as a lagged dependent 
categorical variable. For schools, we also interact the mean distance of schools in the district in the initial 
period with the initial village condition. For estimation purposes, we use ordered probits with and without 
the district-fixed effects. 
9
                                                       
7 The GRDP data come from the World Bank’s Jakarta office. 
); we assume that the higher the proportion of households in poverty, the lower the availability of 
resources for public goods. Although transfers from the central government via districts may reduce 
inequity, there are still cross-community differences in resource availability and constraints, as discussed 
in Sections 1 and 2. Due to the possibility of endogeneity between income and public goods, we use 
either a one-period lagged income or the income at the beginning of the period. 
8 Notably, there was a large decline in the number of primary and junior high schools (Table 1) between 1996 and 2000. It 
does not seem likely that the entire decline could be explained by underreporting. Although this question should be studied 
further using school census data, the most plausible explanation would seem to be that many privately-run and community-run 
schools had become unsustainable and were shut down during this period.  
9 The Family Planning Coordinating Board (BKKBN) of Indonesia classifies all households into five welfare strata: (1) pre-
prosperous households (Keluarga Pra Sejahtera or KPS), (2) prosperous households level I (Keluarga Sejahtera I or KS I), (3) 
KS II, (4) KS III, and (5) KS III+. Poor households are often equated to KPS households alone, or KPS and KS I households. See 




Table 1. Characteristics of and changes in roads, schools, and healthcare facilities: 1996–2000 and 
2000–2006 
  1996  2000  2006  1996–2000  2000–2006 
  (percent) 
Roads           
Paved  57.51  55.42  58.03  –  – 
Hardened  25.02  28.88  25.77  –  – 
Soil  17.12  15.26  15.77  –  – 
Other  0.35  0.45  0.54  –  – 
Improved  –  –  –  13.73  19.57 
No change  –  –  –  74.07  68.66 
Deteriorated  –  –  –  12.2  11.77 
Schools           
Primary schools (yes-1)  92.42  73.98  91.3     
Improved        0.59  18.28 
No change        83.95  80.76 
Deteriorated        15.47  0.96 
Junior high school (yes-1)  41.46  24.93  44.42     
Improved        2.87  21.64 
No change        78.93  76.22 
Deteriorated        18.2  2.14 
Health facilities           
Puskesmas (yes-1)  4.3  5.6  12.1     
Improved        2.34  7.66 
No change        95.98  89.98 
Deteriorated        1.68  2.36 
Polyclinic (yes-1)  10.9  11.6  10.7     
Improved        3.13  2.33 
No change        95.08  95.91 
Deteriorated        1.79  1.76 
The second explanatory variable of interest is local preference. Here, we consider characteristics 
such as the village head’s gender, age, education, and tenure, and the gender composition of the voters. 
Notably, although the total number of female village heads in the PODES dataset is relatively large (due 
to the large sample size), the proportion of villages with female heads is actually very small. 




Table 2. Summary statistics 
    1996–2000    2000–2006 







Road_Change  Change in village road between (t–1) and t 
periods. Three possible states are deterioration 
1, no change 2, and improvement 3 
2.014  0.509    2.067  0.562 
Road_hard  If type of village road was hardened in (t-1) 
period equals 1, else 0 
0.250  0.433    0.289  0.453 
Road_paved  If type of village road was paved in (t-1) period 
equals 1, else 0 
0.575  0.494    0.554  0.497 
Primary school change  Change in primary school between (t-1) and t 
periods. Three possible states are deterioration 
1, no change 2, and improvement 3 
1.851  0.372    2.173  0.403 
Primary school (t-1)  If village had primary school in (t-1) period 
equals 1, else 0 
0.924  0.265    0.740  0.439 
Mean distance primary (t-
1) 
Average distance of primary schools in district 
(in km) in (t-1) period 
0.449  9.849    1.280  32.540 
Junior high school change  Change in junior high school between (t-1) and t 
periods. Three possible states are deterioration 
1, no change 2, and improvement 3 
1.847  0.433    2.195  0.447 
Junior high school (t-1)  If village had junior high school in (t-1) period 
equals 1, else 0 
0.415  0.493    0.249  0.433 
Mean distance junior (t-1)  Average distance of junior high school in district 
(in km) in (t-1) period 
7.084  33.122    7.930  36.570 
Polyclinic_Change  Change in polyclinic between (t–1) and t 
periods. Three possible states are deterioration 
1, no change 2, and improvement 3 
2.013  0.221    2.053  0.312 
Polyclinic (t-1)  If village had a polyclinic in (t-1) equals 1, else 0  0.042  0.200    0.055  0.227 
Puskesma_Change  Change in puskesma between (t–1) and t periods. 
Three possible states are deterioration 1, no 
change 2, and improvement 3 
2.007  0.201    2.006  0.202 
Puskesma (t-1)  If village had a puskesma in (t-1) equals 1, else 0  0.106  0.308    0.111  0.314 
Income (t-1)  The availability of local resource at village level 
in the (t-1) period. If village had 50 percent or 
more families in welfare equals 1, else 0 
0.606  0.489    0.495  0.500 
GRDP  Annual growth in real gross regional domestic 
product 
-1.873  18.934    14.537  6.527 
Head’s gender  Gender of village head (male 1, female 0)  0.980  0.139    0.977  0.149 
Age of village head  Age of village head in years  44.655  8.683    44.424  8.926 
Education of village head  Not completed 1, else 0  0.026  0.160    0.040  0.197 
Education of village head  Primary school 1, else 0  0.259  0.438    0.171  0.377 
Education of village head  Junior high school 1, else 0  0.276  0.447    0.281  0.449 
Education of village head  High school 1, else 0  0.350  0.477    0.392  0.488 
Education of village head  Academy 1, else 0  0.039  0.193    0.035  0.184 
Education of village head  University 1, else 0  0.046  0.210    0.075  0.264 
Duration of village head  Duration of village head in years  5.692  5.054    4.637  5.113 
Percent of women voters  Percent of women voters in village among total 
voters 
49.067  8.869    50.169  4.453 
Population (t-1)  The size of village population in (t-1) period  2,985.000  8,574.000    2,871.000  3,762.000 
Station_Port (t-1)  If the village had any station/terminal/airport/ 
seaport in period (t-1) periods equals 1, else 0 
0.057  0.231    0.068  0.252 
Disaster (t-1)  Any disaster in the last three years: yes 1, no 2  0.534  0.499    0.394  0.489 





5.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Local Income and Changes in Local Public Goods 
Tables 3, 4a, 4b, 5a, and 5b show the estimation results we obtain when we regress the change in local 
public goods (roads, schools, and health facilities) on local income (rich or poor) while controlling for the 
other factors described in equation (1), including the initial stock of public goods. The estimated 
coefficients are derived from ordered probits generated without and with district-fixed effects (FE). 
Results are shown for both the pre-decentralization (1996–2000) and post-decentralization (2000–2006) 
periods. To ensure comparability between these two periods, the parameters for the latter are adjusted to 
reflect an equal length of time (four years). 
As can be seen in the tables, the results show a significant dependency of roads, public schools,
10
Local government jurisdictions in Indonesia are not financially self-sufficient, and their revenue-
raising capabilities can vary widely, depending on local economic activities and resources. Although 
unified fiscal transfers are provided from the central government, inequality persists among local 
jurisdictions, and revenue shortfalls (relative to expenditure responsibilities) often mean that poor 
jurisdictions have fewer public goods. This is true for all three types of public goods discussed herein. Of 
interest, however, although one might expect that local public goods would not depend on local income in 
the pre-decentralization period, our empirical findings show otherwise. 
 
and healthcare facilities on local income and resources, in both the pre- and post-decentralization periods. 
This indicates that, compared to a rich village, a village with more poor households is less likely to see 
improvement of its existing public infrastructures or provision of new public infrastructures. Note that the 
reverse causality of public infrastructures to income is controlled for in this estimation. It is therefore the 
local income, in addition to other factors, that determines local public goods here.  
How has the decentralization changed this dependency? A comparison of the estimated 
coefficients (marginal effects) of local income between the pre- and in-decentralization periods shows 
that, contrary to our expectations, the dependency of local public infrastructures on local income declined 
substantially following decentralization.
11
This finding is counterintuitive and goes against our initial expectations in suggesting that 
decentralization has actually eased local resource constraints. There are several plausible explanations for 
this finding. For example, competition among local government jurisdictions may have enhanced their 
efficiencies (Tiebout 1956). Alternatively, local benefits may be linked to local costs, allowing local 
governments to tailor public goods and services to local circumstances (Musgrave 1959). There may be 
increased accountability among bureaucrats who report directly to the locally elected representative rather 
than the central government (Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006). Finally, decentralization might have 
changed the priority among competing, locally financed public goods, with the result that the voters may 
have prioritized the local public goods considered herein over alternative uses of their local resources. 
This issue of priority/preference is discussed further in the next section. 
 This finding remains equally valid across the examined public 
goods and across estimation methods. Although the addition of district-fixed effects reduces the size of 
the income coefficient, it does not change the pre- and post-decentralization period differences. 
It seems that decentralization actually improved the availability of local public goods in poor 
communities. While the differences in local public goods between rich and poor localities were largely 
maintained, it did not seem to depend heavily on local income, even though this dependency was initially 
thought to be the main impediment against convergence in the decentralized regime. Horizontal 
inequalities among local jurisdictions are not uncommon in other countries, and experience has shown 
that vertical transfers may not be sufficient to ensure equality. However, local jurisdictions have the 
benefit of being able to provide public goods according to local needs and fiscal/financial capabilities. 
The Indonesian experience appears to indicate these.
                                                       
10 Primary schools are the exception; this parameter shows a positive relationship, indicating that poor villages financed 
more primary schools during the decentralized period. 




Table 3. Local income and changes in local public goods: Village roads 
  Dependent variable: change in village road: deterioration 1, no change 2, improvement 3 
  Estimation method: ordered probit 
  1996–2000    2000–2006 

























Villages with 50% or more families in 
pre-welfare and welfare 1 in (t-1) 
period: yes 1, no 0 
-0.2400  -0.0352    -0.1949  -0.0258    -0.2390  -0.0349    -0.0845  -0.0184    -0.0950  -0.0187    -0.0934  -0.0297 
(0.0310)***  (0.0046)***    (0.0212)***  (0.0030)***    (0.0320)***  (0.0048)***    (0.0211)***  (0.0046)***    (0.0170)***  (0.0033)***    (0.0260)***  (0.0083)*** 
Road_hardened in (t-1) period equals 
1, else 0 
-0.8000  -0.0872    -0.8878  -0.0851    -0.8160  -0.0894    -0.3769  -0.0721    -0.6331  -0.1000    -0.4442  -0.1224 
(0.0560)***  (0.0050)***    (0.0555)***  (0.0055)***    (0.0590)***  (0.0053)***    (0.0416)***  (0.0073)***    (0.0359)***  (0.0061)***    (0.0494)***  (0.0125)*** 
Road_paved in (t-1) period equals 1, 
else 0 
-2.0070  -0.4030    -2.328  -0.4598    -2.0180  -0.4031    -1.2375  -0.3009    -1.6632  -0.3850    -1.4094  -0.5132 
(0.0640)***  (0.0158)***    (0.0676)***  (0.0140)***    (0.0670)***  (0.0166)***    (0.0416)***  (0.0120)***    (0.0471)***  (0.0088)***    (0.0527)***  (0.0211)*** 
Population of village in (t-1) 
period X 10^4 
0.0388  0.0055    0.0234  0.0030    0.0416  0.0059    0.2158  0.0471    0.1000  0.0197    0.2181  0.0692 
(0.0140)***  (0.0000)**    (0.0120)***  (0.0000)**    (0.0150)*  (0.0000)*    (0.0271)***  (0.0000)***    (0.0193)***  (0.0000)***    (0.0307)***  (0.0000)*** 
If the village had any terminal/ 
station/port in (t-1) period: yes 1, no 0 
0.1760  0.0279    0.2059  0.0304    0.1860  0.0297    0.0805  0.0186    0.1379  0.0302    0.1074  0.0369 
(0.0290)***  (0.0052)***    (0.0298)***  (0.0051)***    (0.0290)***  (0.0052)***    (0.0205)***  (0.0049)***    (0.0173)***  (0.0044)***    (0.0207)***  (0.0076)*** 
Village topography (hill area 0, 
flatland 1) 
0.1410  0.0192    0.1702  0.0208    0.1360  0.0185    0.1247  0.0260    0.1375  0.0256    0.1174  0.0356 
(0.0310)***  (0.0040)***    (0.0298)***  (0.0035)***    (0.0320)***  (0.0041)***    (0.0231)***  (0.0046)***    (0.0188)***  (0.0035)***    (0.0280)***  (0.0079)*** 
Any disaster in last three years: yes 1, 
no 2 
-0.0472  -0.0067    -0.1026  -0.0131    -0.0567  -0.0080    -0.0597  -0.0129    -0.0231  -0.0045    -0.0787  -0.0246 
(0.0310)  (0.0044)    (0.0303)***  (0.0038)***    (0.0320)***  (0.0046)***    (0.0185)***  (0.0040)***    (0.0167)  (0.0032)    (0.0247)***  (0.0052)*** 
Annual GRDP growth              -0.0342  -0.0049                -0.0045  -0.0014 
              (0.0660)  (0.0094)                (0.0045)  (0.0014) 
Fixed effects included  No      Yes      No      No      Yes      No   
Observations  49,168      49,168      49,168      51,995      51,995      51,995   
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. District-specific constants are not reported in the table. GRDP: gross 
regional domestic product. 




Table 4a. Local income and changes in local public goods: Primary schools 
  Dependent variable: change in the availability of primary schools in village 
  Estimation method: ordered probit 
  1996–2000    2000–2006 

























Villages with 50% or more families in 
pre-welfare and welfare 1 in (t-1) 
period: yes 1, no 0 
-0.0296  -0.0008    -0.0485  -0.0015    -0.0111  -0.0003    0.0999  0.0036    0.0335  0.00245    0.0884  0.0021 
(0.0420)  (0.0011)    (0.0400)  (0.0011)    (0.0418)  (0.0011)    (0.0273)***  (0.0011)***    (0.0247)  (0.0011)    (0.0328)***  (0.0010)** 
If the village had a primary school in 
(t-1) period: yes 1, no 0 
3.4220  0.7934    3.1620  0.7742    3.4410  0.7933    1.8282  0.4063    1.6525  0.39427    1.8680  0.3783 
(0.0770)***  (0.0303)***    (0.0780)***  (0.0322)***    (0.0844)***  (0.0338)***    (0.0420)***  (0.0218)***    (0.0440)***  (0.0240)    (0.0570)***  (0.0306)*** 
Mean distance in district in (t-1) 
period X initial condition X 100 
0.5290  0.0139    0.5960  0.0086    0.5430  0.0139    -0.0022  -0.0001    0.0205  0.0010    0.0137  0.0003 
(0.1900)***  (0.0060)**    (0.2100)**  (0.0050)*    (0.1880)***  (0.0050)***    (0.0087)  (0.0001)    (0.0100)**  (0.0007)    (0.0054)**  (0.0001)*** 
Population of village in (t-1) 
period X 10^4 
1.9000  0.0500    1.4000  0.0490    1.9000  0.0484    1.8515  0.0661    1.2065  0.06610    2.1641  0.0521 
(0.4200)***  (0.0001)***    (0.3700)***  (0.0001)***    (0.4500)***  (0.0001)***    (0.2464)***  (0.0001)***    (0.1667)***  (0.0001)    (0.2881)***  (0.0001)*** 
If the village had any terminal/ 
station/port in (t-1) period: yes 1, no 0 
-0.0523  -0.0015    -0.1220  -0.0035    -0.1400  -0.0041    -0.0230  -0.0009    -0.0623  -0.00355    -0.0553  -0.0015 
(0.0940)  (0.0027)    (0.0950)  (0.0030)    (0.0920)  (0.0030)    (0.0493)  (0.0019)    (0.0507)  (0.0024)    (0.0737)  (0.0022) 
Village topography (hill area 0, 
flatland 1) 
-0.0935  -0.0023    -0.0467  -0.0019    -0.1110  -0.0027    -0.0522  -0.0018    0.0023  -0.00001    -0.0744  -0.0017 
(0.0570)*  (0.0014)*    (0.0460)  (0.0013)    (0.0574)*  (0.0014)*    (0.0366)  (0.0012)    (0.0267)  (0.0011)    (0.0389)*  (0.0009)* 
Any disaster in last three years: yes 1, 
no 2 
0.0211  0.0006    -0.0666  -0.0001    0.0066  0.0002    -0.0986  -0.0037    -0.0319  -0.00236    -0.1561  -0.0040 
(0.0540)  (0.0014)    (0.0520)  (0.0013)    (0.0531)  (0.0013)    (0.0446)**  (0.0019)*    (0.0180)*  (0.0014)    (0.0523)***  (0.0018)** 
Annual GRDP growth x 100              0.6890  0.0176                -0.2968  -0.0071 
              (0.2240)***  (0.0070)***                (0.2613)  (0.0067) 
Fixed effects included  No      Yes      No      No      Yes      No   
Observations  52,127      52,127      52,127      55,129      55,129      55,129   
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. District-specific constants are not reported in the table. GRDP: gross 
regional domestic product. 




Table 4b. Local income and changes in local public goods: Junior high schools 
  Dependent variable: change in the availability of junior high schools in village 
  Estimation method: ordered probit 
  1996–2000    2000–2006 

























Villages with 50% or more families in 
pre-welfare and welfare 1 in (t-1) 
period: yes 1, no 0 
-0.1190  -0.0390    -0.1103  -0.0355    -0.1150  -0.0379    0.0007  0.0003    -0.0019  -0.0007    0.0005  0.0002 
(0.0250)***  (0.0082)***    (0.0006)***  (0.0070)***    (0.0260)***  (0.0086)***    (0.0132)  (0.0046)    (0.0129)  (0.0045)    (0.0153)  (0.0055) 
If the village had a junior high school 
in (t-1) period: yes 1, no 0 
2.8670  0.8462    10.7398  0.8430    2.8700  0.8468    1.6236  0.5173    1.6222  0.5170    1.6435  0.5213 
(0.0310)***  (0.0045)***    (0.0066)***  (0.0049)***    (0.0070)***  (0.0070)***    (0.0221)***  (0.0042)***    (0.0221)***  (0.0042)***    (0.0260)***  (0.0048)*** 
Mean distance in district in (t-1) 
period X initial condition X 100 
-0.0015  -0.0005    -0.0055  -0.0018    -0.0019  -0.0006    -0.0013  -0.0005    -0.0037  -0.0013    0.0036  0.0013 
(0.0034)  (0.0001)    (0.0041)  (0.0010)    (0.0036)  (0.0010)    (0.0023)  (0.0007)    (0.0023)  (0.0007)    (0.0041)  (0.0013) 
Population of village in (t-1) 
period X 10^4 
0.0615  0.0200    0.0362  0.0115    0.0597  0.0195    0.5509  0.1928    0.5629  0.1968    0.5523  0.1994 
(0.0270)**  (0.0001)**    (0.0160)**  (0.0001)**    (0.0260)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0513)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0516)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0574)***  (0.0001)*** 
If the village had any terminal/ 
station/port in (t-1) period: yes 1, no 0 
0.2000  0.0682    0.1897  0.0637    0.1930  0.0662    0.1261  0.0458    0.1123  0.0406    0.1061  0.0392 
(0.0380)***  (0.0134)***    (0.0019)***  (0.0129)***    (0.0390)***  (0.0139)***    (0.0234)***  (0.0088)***    (0.0242)***  (0.0091)***    (0.0273)***  (0.0104)*** 
Village topography (hill area 0, 
flatland 1) 
-0.0033  -0.0011    -0.0023  -0.0007    -0.0109  -0.0036    -0.0011  -0.0004    0.0075  0.0026    -0.0107  -0.0039 
(0.0270)  (0.0088)    (0.0011)  (0.0077)    (0.0280)  (0.0092)    (0.0173)  (0.0061)    (0.0169)  (0.0059)    (0.0207)  (0.0074) 
Any disaster in last three years: yes 1, 
no 2 
-0.0596  -0.0193    -0.0067  -0.0021    -0.0691  -0.0225    0.0195  0.0068    0.0211  0.0074    0.0073  0.0026 
(0.0240)**  (0.0079)**    (0.0008)  (0.0075)    (0.0250)***  (0.0082)**    (0.0145)  (0.0051)    (0.0134)**  (0.0047)**    (0.0173)***  (0.0062)*** 
Annual GRDP growth              0.1590  0.0518                -0.1254  -0.0453 
              (0.0500)***  (0.0160)**                (0.2134)  (0.0767) 
Fixed effects included  No      Yes      No      No      Yes      No   
Observations  52,127      52,127      48,335      55,129      55,129      55,129   
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. District-specific constants are not reported in the table. GRDP: gross 
regional domestic product. 




Table 5a. Local income and changes in local public goods: Healthcare infrastructure (polyclinic) 
  Dependent variable: change in the availability of polyclinic in village 
  Estimation method: ordered probit 
  1996–2000    2000–2006 

























Villages with 50% or more families in 
pre-welfare and welfare 1 in (t-1) 
period: yes 1, no 0 
-0.3790  -0.0127    -0.3411  -0.0011    -0.3770  -0.0127    -0.1107  -0.0062    -0.1335  -0.0018    -0.1313  -0.0069 
(0.0120)***  (0.0006)***    (0.0011)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0120)***  (0.0006)***    (0.0273)***  (0.0017)***    (0.0005)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0288)***  (0.0018)*** 
If the village had a polyclinic in (t-1) 
period: yes 1, no 0 
-7.6650  -0.0267    -13.8308  -0.0056    -7.6410  -0.0272    -6.6767  -0.0497    -9.3162  -0.0213    -7.4504  -0.0568 
(0.0250)***  (0.0023)***    (0.0151)***  (0.0002)***    (0.0250)***  (0.0024)***    (0.4669)***  (0.0033)***    (0.0093)***  (0.0003)***    (0.5025)***  (0.0041)*** 
If the village had a puskesmas in (t-1) 
period: yes 1, no 0 
0.6140  0.0327    0.6132  0.0040    0.6100  0.0326    0.1734  0.0177    0.2372  0.0046    0.1896  0.0124 
(0.0140)***  (0.0035)***    (0.0022)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0140)***  (0.0036)***    (0.0227)***  (0.0031)***    (0.0022)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0248)***  (0.0023)*** 
Population of village in (t-1) 
period X 10^4 
0.0778  0.0024    0.0478  0.0002    0.0757  0.0023    0.6670  0.0371    0.4562  0.0061    0.6184  0.0326 
(0.0023)***  (0.0000)***    (0.0004)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0023)***  (0.0000)***    (0.0600)***  (0.0000)***    (0.0017)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0670)***  (0.0001)*** 
If the village had any terminal/ 
station/port in (t-1) period: yes 1, no 0 
0.3870  0.0173    0.4112  0.0021    0.3840  0.0172    0.1087  0.0070    0.1866  0.0034    0.0958  0.0057 
(0.0130)***  (0.0022)***    (0.0027)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0140)***  (0.0022)***    (0.0300)***  (0.0024)***    (0.0023)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0288)***  (0.0021)*** 
Village topography (hill area 0, 
flatland 1) 
0.1720  0.0048    0.1801  0.0005    0.1830  0.0051    0.0612  0.0033    0.1209  0.0015    0.1072  0.0052 
(0.0130)***  (0.0008)***    (0.0016)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0140)***  (0.0008)***    (0.0334)*  (0.0018)***    (0.0011)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0322)***  (0.0016)*** 
Any disaster in last three years: yes 1, 
no 2 
-0.0553  -0.0017    -0.0400  -0.0001    -0.0500  -0.0015    -0.0184  -0.0010    -0.0049  -0.0001    -0.0056  -0.0003 
(0.0130)***  (0.0002)***    (0.0011)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0130)***  (0.0003)***    (0.0200)  (0.0011)    (0.0009)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0221)  (0.0012) 
Annual GRDP growth x 100              0.0582  0.0018                0.6553  0.0345 
              (0.0014)***  (0.0000)***                (0.5293)  (0.0288) 
Fixed effects included  No      Yes      No      No      Yes      No   
Observations  52,127      52,127      52,127      55,129      55,129      55,129   
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. District-specific constants are not reported in the table. GRDP: gross 
regional domestic product. 




Table 5b. Local income and changes in local public goods: Healthcare infrastructure (puskesmas) 
  Dependent variable: change in the availability of puskesmas in village 
  Estimation method: ordered probit 
  1996–2000    2000–2006 

























Villages with 50% or more families in 
pre-welfare and welfare 1 in (t-1) 
period: yes 1, no 0 
-0.1200  -0.0015    -0.1427  -0.0003    -0.1160  -0.0014    -0.0504  -0.0006    -0.0404  -0.0006    -0.0398  -0.0004 
(0.0063)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0008)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0067)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0048)***  (0.0001)**    (0.0162)**  (0.0001)**    (0.0059)***  (0.0001)*** 
If the village had a puskesmas in (t-1) 
period: yes 1, no 0 
-6.2740  -0.0258    -11.0575  -0.0232    -6.2750  -0.0255    -4.2555  -0.0174    -8.6149  -0.0173    -4.3262  -0.0160 
(0.0170)***  (0.0011)***    (0.0123)***  (0.0003)***    (0.0170)***  (0.0012)***    (0.0107)***  (0.0010)***    (0.0322)***  (0.0013)***    (0.0140)***  (0.0016)*** 
If the village had a polyclinic in (t-1) 
period: yes 1, no 0 
0.3600  0.0067    0.2865  0.0010    0.3820  0.0072    0.0907  0.0012    0.0946  0.0012    0.0834  0.0009 
(0.0073)***  (0.0005)***    (0.0031)***  (0.0002)***    (0.0076)***  (0.0006)***    (0.0067)***  (0.0002)***    (0.0042)***  (0.0002)***    (0.0080)***  (0.0002)*** 
Population of village in (t-1) 
period X 10^4 
0.0426  0.0005    0.0342  0.0007    0.0411  0.0005    0.2368  0.0026    0.2165  0.0027    0.2715  0.0024 
(0.0012)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0004)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0012)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0080)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0020)***  (0.0002)***    (0.0093)***  (0.0001)*** 
If the village had any terminal/station/ 
port in (t-1) period: yes 1, no 0 
0.3630  0.0067    0.3638  0.0014    0.3710  0.0068    0.1881  0.0029    0.1618  0.0026    0.1607  0.0019 
(0.0068)***  (0.0005)***    (0.0024)***  (0.0000)***    (0.0070)***  (0.0005)***    (0.0061)***  (0.0003)**    (0.0162)***  (0.0003)***    (0.0080)***  (0.0003)*** 
Village topography (hill area 0, 
flatland 1) 
0.0371  0.0004    0.0525  0.0001    0.0347  0.0004    0.0167  0.0002    0.0581  0.0003    0.0282  0.0002 
(0.0073)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0014)***  (0.0000)***    (0.0077)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0060)***  (0.0001)**    (0.0242)**  (0.0001)**    (0.0073)***  (0.0001)*** 
Any disaster in last three years: yes 1, 
no 2 
0.0178  0.0002    0.0191  0.0004    0.0125  0.0001    0.0279  0.0003    -0.0137  0.0003    0.0323  0.0003 
(0.0067)***  (0.0001)**    (0.0009)***  (0.0000)**    (0.0069)*  (0.0001)    (0.0051)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0170)  (0.0001)***    (0.0063)***  (0.0001)*** 
Annual GRDP growth x 100              -0.0033  -0.00038                -0.0018  -0.0016 
              (0.0014)**  (0.0001)***                (0.0005)***  (0.0001)*** 
Fixed effects included        Yes      No            Yes      No   
Observations  52,127      52,127      52,127      55,129      55,129      55,129   
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. District-specific constants are not reported in the table. GRDP: gross 








Local Preference and Changes in Local Public Goods 
Different groups within a local jurisdiction may have different preferences when choosing among 
alternative public goods, and the possibility of rank-ordering these alternatives may enable them to 
choose one public good over another. Tables 6, 7a, 7b, 8a, and 8b present the estimation results for the 
impact of local preference on the changes in local public goods between two time points. We regress the 
changes on a set of preference indicators while controlling for the other factors described in equation (2), 
such as the initial stock of public goods and the local income. The estimated coefficients are derived from 
ordered probits without and with district-fixed effects (FE). Results are shown for both the pre-
decentralization (1996–2000) and post-decentralization (2000–2006) periods. 
The two explanatory variables that are of most interest for the preference proxies are the gender 
of the desa head and the gender composition of the voters. For the local road, the presence of a female 
desa head has a positive effect on local road provision. Although the male/female voter composition does 
not significantly have an impact on the road provision during the pre-decentralization period, it is 
significant for the post-decentralization period. This suggests that roads ranked very high on the 
preference lists of women voters, and this preference was reflected in the allocation of public goods under 
the decentralized regime. This finding is similar to the results of other studies on the benefits of rural 
roads for all households, poorer households, and female-headed households (Jacoby 2000; Gibson and 
Rozelle 2003). Our finding of a gender-differentiated preference in public goods allocation is similar to 
that found in Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004). 
In the case of educational infrastructure, the presence of a female desa head has a positive impact 
on the provision of junior high schools. However, this effect becomes insignificant if we control for 
district-fixed effects. Similarly, the number of years of schooling of the desa head has a positive impact 
on school provision, but this finding becomes insignificant if we control for district-fixed effects. 
Notably, Indonesia has a diverse educational system in which general education, technical education, 
religious education, and public and private education institutions all co-exist. Therefore the local-level 
allocation of public funds to education could be much more complex than reflected herein. 
In the case of healthcare infrastructure, the impact of gender-differentiated preference indicators 
is either mixed or insignificant during the post-decentralization period. There are at least two plausible 
explanations for this. First, as compared to roads, healthcare (and educational) infrastructures are more 
complex to build and require resources beyond the physical structures, such as doctors and nurses 
(teachers). The recruitment and retention of such resources require policies and plans that are not 
considered herein. Second, due to spillovers, there may be free-riding and coordination problems that 
extend beyond local resources and preferences. While the externalities for local roads are easy to capture 
within a locality, those for healthcare (and education) infrastructures are not as easy to exclude.
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We further see that the tenures of elected local government officials are negatively related to the 
provision of local public infrastructures. One plausible explanation for this finding is that because elected 
representatives in Indonesia have a short time horizon, they may ignore long-term prospects in favor of 
more immediate payoffs. If the prospect of reelection diminishes with duration in office, the goal of 
public officials might systematically diverge from the maximization of citizen welfare, especially in their 
second terms (Brennan and Buchanan 1980). Since the decentralization of Indonesia, there has been some 
experimentation within the local government selection process. This may have created a certain degree of 
uncertainty in the minds of elected officials.
 
                                                       




Table 6. Local preference and changes in local public goods: Village roads 
  Dependent variable: change in village road: deterioration 1, no change 2, improvement 3 
  Estimation method: ordered probit 
  1996–2000    2000–2006 

























Village head’s gender in (t-1) period 
(male 1, female 0) 
0.0121  0.0017    -0.006  -0.0008    0.0100  0.0014    -0.0559  -0.0124    -0.0228  -0.0045    -0.0632  -0.0140 
(0.0430)  (0.0058)    (0.0414)  (0.0053)    (0.0440)  (0.0060)    (0.0268)**  (0.0062)**    (0.0260)  (0.0052)    (0.0293)***  (0.0068)*** 
Percent of women voters in 
village X 10^2 
0.0323  0.0045    0.0400  0.0049    0.0083  0.00115    0.8911  0.1905    0.6937  0.1346    0.5776  0.1212 
(0.0010)  (0.0140)    (0.0014)  (0.0180)    (0.0980)  (0.0140)    (0.2345)***  (0.0500)***    (0.2068)***  (0.0394)***    (0.2801)**  (0.0594)** 
Village head’s age in (t-1) period  0.0061  0.0008    0.0045  0.0006    0.0065  0.0009    0.0044  0.0009    0.0036  0.0007    0.0036  0.0008 
(0.0012)***  (0.0002)***    (0.0010)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0012)***  (0.0002)***    (0.0009)***  (0.0002)***    (0.0005)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0009)***  (0.0002)*** 
Village head’s education in t-1 period                                   
  Not completed  0.0114  0.0016    -0.1104  -0.0129    0.0841  0.0124    0.0464  0.0102    -0.0532  -0.0098    0.0576  0.0127 
(0.1700)  (0.0236)    (0.1592)  (0.0170)    (0.1700)  (0.0270)    (0.0871)  (0.0200)    (0.0867)  (0.0156)    (0.0867)  (0.0197) 
  Primary school  0.2440  0.0375    0.0664  0.0086    0.3130  0.0495    0.0291  0.0063    -0.0980  -0.0179    0.0526  0.0114 
  (0.1600)*  (0.0269)    (0.1425)  (0.0191)    (0.1700)*  (0.0295)*    (0.0938)  (0.0202)    (0.0934)  (0.0160)    (0.0934)  (0.0209) 
  Junior high school  0.2820  0.0432    0.1425  0.0189    0.3590  0.0563    0.0951  0.0210    -0.0507  -0.0096    0.1081  0.0237 
  (0.1600)*  (0.0271)*    (0.1457)  (0.0204)    (0.1700)**  (0.0296)**    (0.0938)  (0.0213)    (0.0934)  (0.0172)    (0.0934)  (0.0212) 
  High school  0.3620  0.0538    0.223  0.0293    0.4430  0.0667    0.1990  0.0437    0.0296  0.0058    0.2181  0.0471 
  (0.1600)**  (0.0258)**    (0.1458)  (0.0201)    (0.1700)***  (0.0275)**    (0.0938)***  (0.0211)**    (0.0934)  (0.0181)    (0.0934)***  (0.0205)*** 
  Academy  0.5130  0.0982    0.3441  0.0547    0.5850  0.1164    0.2533  0.0645    0.0680  0.0139    0.2735  0.0697 
  (0.1600)***  (0.0400)***    (0.1475)**  (0.0288)**    (0.1700)***  (0.0444)***    (0.0938)***  (0.0283)**    (0.0934)  (0.0206)    (0.0934)***  (0.0284)*** 
  University  0.4040  0.0722    0.235  0.0347    0.4920  0.0924    0.2539  0.0637    0.0612  0.0124    0.2681  0.0668 
  (0.1600)**  (0.0357)    (0.1468)  (0.0251)    (0.1700)***  (0.0403)**    (0.0938)***  (0.0273)***    (0.0934)  (0.0197)    (0.0934)***  (0.0268)*** 
Village head’s duration in years  -0.0053  -0.0007    -0.0007  -0.0001    -0.0052  -0.0007    -0.0069  -0.0015    -0.0007  -0.0001    -0.0077  -0.0016 
(0.0017)***  (0.0002)***    (0.0016)  (0.0002)    (0.0017)***  (0.0002)**    (0.0013)***  (0.0003)***    (0.0010)  (0.0002)    (0.0016)***  (0.0003)*** 
Villages with 50% or more families in 
pre-welfare and welfare 1 in (t-1) 
period: yes 1, no 0 
-0.2060  -0.0293    -0.1795  -0.0231    -0.2020  -0.0287    -0.0757  -0.0161    -0.0874  -0.0168    -0.0834  -0.0175 
(0.0310)***  (0.0044)***    (0.0217)**  (0.0029)***    (0.0320)***  (0.0046)***    (0.0208)***  (0.0044)***    (0.0167)***  (0.0032)***    (0.0253)***  (0.0053)*** 
Road hardened in (t-1) period equals 1, 
else 0 
-0.7940  -0.0833    -0.8829  -0.0811    -0.8130  -0.0855    -0.4094  -0.0758    -0.6403  -0.0989    -0.4622  -0.0837 
(0.0560)***  (0.0048)***    (0.0569)***  (0.0053)***    (0.0590)***  (0.0051)***    (0.0402)***  (0.0067)***    (0.0360)***  (0.0060)***    (0.0480)***  (0.0080)*** 
Road_paved in (t-1) period equals 1, 
else 0 
-2.0510  -0.4187    -2.3611  -0.4743    -2.0660  -0.4200    -1.3018  -0.3103    -1.6828  -0.3827    -1.4461  -0.3497 
(0.0660)***  (0.0165)***    (0.0695)***  (0.0146)***    (0.0690)***  (0.0175)***    (0.0395)***  (0.0112)***    (0.0467)***  (0.0087)***    (0.0507)***  (0.0135)*** 
Population of village in (t-1) 
period X 10^4 
0.0287  0.0521    0.0208  0.0026    0.0312  0.0043    0.1789  0.0382    0.0840  0.0162    0.1828  0.0384 
(0.0110)**  (0.0001)**    (0.0110)*  (0.0001)**    (0.0130)**  (0.0001)*    (0.0255)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0187)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0280)***  (0.0001)*** 
If the village had any terminal/station/ 
port in (t-1) period: yes 1, no 0 
0.1560  0.0240    0.195  0.0280    0.1670  0.0258    0.0771  0.0173    0.1307  0.0280    0.0994  0.0225 
(0.0280)***  (0.0048)***    (0.0295)***  (0.0049)**    (0.0290)***  (0.0049)***    (0.0201)***  (0.0047)***    (0.0173)***  (0.0043)***    (0.0200)***  (0.0048)*** 
Village topography (hill area 0, 
flatland 1) 
0.1400  0.0187    0.1543  0.0185    0.1350  0.0179    0.1139  0.0233    0.1294  0.0237    0.1041  0.0210 
(0.0310)***  (0.0040)***    (0.0302)***  (0.0034)**    (0.0320)***  (0.0041)***    (0.0228)***  (0.0044)***    (0.0187)***  (0.0035)***    (0.0273)***  (0.0052)*** 
Any disaster in last three years: yes 1, 
no 2 
-0.0474  -0.0066    -0.1088  -0.0136    -0.0564  -0.0078    -0.0567  -0.0120    -0.0223  -0.0043    -0.0727  -0.0150 
(0.0310)  (0.0043)    (0.0305)***  (0.0038)    (0.0320)*  (0.0044)***    (0.0188)***  (0.0039)***    (0.0167)  (0.0032)    (0.0240)***  (0.0049)*** 
Annual GRDP growth X 100              -0.0637  -0.0089                -0.4356  -0.0915 
              (0.0770)  (0.0110)                (0.4135)  (0.0867) 
Fixed effects included  No      Yes      No      No      Yes      No   
Observations  46,954      46,954      46,954      51,995      51,995      51,995   
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. District-specific constants are not reported in the table. GRDP: gross 




Table 7a.  Local preference and changes in local public goods: Primary schools 
  Dependent variable: change in the availability of primary schools in village 
  Estimation method: ordered probit 
  1996–2000    2000–2006 

























Village head’s gender in (t-1) period 
(male 1, female 0) 
0.0844  0.0017    0.0941  0.0020    0.0997  0.0020    -0.0947  -0.0029    -0.0854  -0.0026    -0.2048  -0.0035 
(0.1200)  (0.0028)    (0.1200)  (0.0029)    (0.1300)  (0.0030)    (0.0580)  (0.0015)    (0.0567)  (0.0015)*    (0.0734)***  (0.0011)** 
Percent of women voters in village  -0.0061  -0.0001    -0.0057  -0.0001    -0.0055  -0.0001    0.0023  0.0001    0.0054  0.0002    0.0091  0.0002 
(0.0027)**  (0.0001)**    (0.0025)**  (0.0001)**    (0.0027)**  (0.0001)*    (0.0073)  (0.0003)    (0.0073)  (0.0003)    (0.0093)  (0.0002) 
Village head’s age in (t-1) period  0.0022  0.0001    0.0020  0.0001    0.0031  0.0001    -0.0018  -0.0001    -0.0003  -0.0001    -0.0026  -0.0001 
(0.0026)  (0.0001)    (0.0025)  (0.0001)    (0.0028)  (0.0001)    (0.0019)  (0.0001)    (0.0019)  (0.0001)    (0.0021)  (0.0001) 
Village head’s education in t-1 period                                   
  Not completed  0.4410  0.0050    0.4600  0.0051    0.5560  0.0053    0.1114  0.0034    0.2254  0.0057    0.0894  0.0018 
(0.3000)  (0.0019)**    (0.3000)  (0.0019)**    (0.3100)*  (0.0016)***    (0.1467)  (0.0037)    (0.1467)  (0.0027)**    (0.2134)  (0.0038) 
  Primary school  0.4600  0.0067    0.5190  0.0073    0.5370  0.0071    0.1601  0.0048    0.2921  0.0076    0.1527  0.0030 
  (0.2600)*  (0.0030)**    (0.2600)**  (0.0029)**    (0.2600)**  (0.0029)**    (0.1401)  (0.0037)    (0.1467)*  (0.0030)**    (0.2201)  (0.0037) 
  Junior high school  0.4790  0.0072    0.5540  0.0080    0.5530  0.0077    0.1274  0.0042    0.2908  0.0085    0.0980  0.0022 
  (0.2600)*  (0.0033)**    (0.2600)**  (0.0032)**    (0.2600)**  (0.0032)**    (0.1467)  (0.0044)    (0.1467)**  (0.0039)**    (0.2201)  (0.0046) 
  High school  0.4930  0.0084    0.5600  0.0094    0.5710  0.0092    0.1941  0.0066    0.3575  0.0117    0.1661  0.0038 
  (0.2600)*  (0.0043)*    (0.2600)**  (0.0044)**    (0.2600)**  (0.0044)**    (0.1467)  (0.0048)    (0.1467)**  (0.0050)**    (0.2201)  (0.0051) 
  Academy  0.3110  0.0042    0.3590  0.0045    0.4150  0.0047    0.0623  0.0020    0.2041  0.0053    0.1047  0.0021 
  (0.2800)  (0.0026)*    (0.2800)  (0.0024)**    (0.2800)*  (0.0021)**    (0.1534)  (0.0045)    (0.1601)  (0.0030)*    (0.2268)  (0.0039) 
  University  0.3340  0.0044    0.3760  0.0047    0.4990  0.0053    0.1154  0.0035    0.2648  0.0066    0.0767  0.0016 
  (0.2800)  (0.0025)    (0.2900)  (0.0024)**    (0.2800)**  (0.0018)**    (0.1534)  (0.0040)    (0.1534)*  (0.0027)**    (0.2268)  (0.0043) 
Village head’s duration in years  0.0059  0.0001    0.0053  0.0001    0.0054  0.0001    -0.0029  -0.0001    -0.0030  -0.0001    -0.0026  -0.0001 
(0.0039)  (0.0001)    (0.0039)  (0.0001)    (0.0040)  (0.0001)    (0.0021)  (0.0001)    (0.0019)  (0.0001)    (0.0025)  (0.0001) 
Villages with 50% or more families in 
pre-welfare and welfare 1 in (t-1) 
period: yes 1, no 0 
-0.0127  -0.0002    -0.0220  -0.0004    -0.0328  -0.0006    0.0987  0.0035    0.0700  0.0025    0.0847  0.0020 
(0.0410)  (0.0008)    (0.0440)  (0.0008)    (0.0430)  (0.0008)    (0.0253)***  (0.0011)    (0.0260)***  (0.0010)**    (0.0300)***  (0.0009)*** 
If the village had a primary school in 
(t-1) period: yes 1, no 0 
3.3580  0.7543    3.3080  0.7382    3.3880  0.7564    1.8343  0.4073    1.8016  0.3941    1.8669  0.3786 
(0.0720)***  (0.0303)**    (0.0800)***  (0.0330)***    (0.0820)***  (0.0349)***    (0.0400)***  (0.0211)    (0.0434)***  (0.0231)***    (0.0527)***  (0.0296)*** 
Mean distance in district in (t-1) period 
X initial condition x 100 
0.5270  0.0099    0.3810  0.0071    0.5450  0.0097    0.0009  0.0000    -0.0232  -0.0008    0.0184  0.0004 
(0.2000)***  (0.0040)**    (0.1700)**  (0.0030)**    (0.2000)**  (0.0040)**    (0.0093)  (0.0007)    (0.0113)**  (0.0007)**    (0.0080)**  (0.0001)** 
Population of village in (t-1) 
period X 10^4 
2.0700  0.0387    2.0700  0.0385    2.0700  0.0368    1.8142  0.0648    1.8343  0.0643    2.1277  0.0508 
(0.3900)***  (0.0000)***    (0.3700)***  (0.0000)***    (0.4200)***  (0.0000)***    (0.2401)***  (0.0000)    (0.2268)***  (0.0000)***    (0.2868)***  (0.0000)*** 
If the village had any terminal/station/ 
port in (t-1) period: yes 1, no 0 
-0.1180  -0.0025    -0.1730  -0.0039    -0.1940  -0.0043    -0.0183  -0.0007    -0.0860  -0.0034    -0.0435  -0.0011 
(0.0940)  (0.0023)    (0.0900)*  (0.0025)    (0.0930)**  (0.0026)**    (0.0467)  (0.0000)    (0.0500)*  (0.0023)    (0.0734)  (0.0020) 
Village topography (hill area 0, 
flatland 1) 
-0.0678  -0.0012    -0.0631  -0.0011    -0.0893  -0.0015    -0.0523  -0.0018    -0.0024  -0.0001    -0.0780  -0.0018 
(0.0530)  (0.0009)    (0.0510)  (0.0009)    (0.0540)*  (0.0009)*    (0.0354)  (0.0012)    (0.0307)  (0.0011)    (0.0367)**  (0.0008)** 
Any disaster in last three years: yes 1, 
no 2 
0.0152  0.0003    0.0002  0.0000    0.0086  0.0002    -0.0967  -0.0036    -0.0631  -0.0023    -0.1481  -0.0038 
(0.0570)  (0.0011)    (0.0530)  (0.0010)    (0.0570)  (0.0010)    (0.0440)**  (0.0018)    (0.0347)*  (0.0014)*    (0.0494)***  (0.0016)** 
Annual GRDP growth x 100              0.5770  0.0103                -0.2448  -0.0058 
              (0.2200)***  (0.0040)***                (0.2601)  (0.0060) 
Fixed effects included  No      Yes      No      No      Yes      No   
Observations  52,127      52,127      52,127      55,129      55,129      55,129   
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. District-specific constants are not reported in the table. GRDP: gross 




Table 7b.  Local preference and changes in local public goods: Junior high schools 
  Dependent variable: change in the availability of junior high schools in village 
  Estimation method: ordered probit 
  1996–2000    2000–2006 

























Village head’s gender in (t-1) period 
(male 1, female 0) 
-0.0572  -0.0193    -0.0577  -0.0194    -0.0593  -0.0201    0.0144  0.0050    0.0159  0.0055    0.0219  0.0078 
(0.0600)  (0.0204)    (0.0600)  (0.0205)    (0.0620)  (0.0213)    (0.0334)  (0.0114)    (0.0327)  (0.0114)    (0.0367)  (0.0131) 
Percent of women voters in village  -0.0019  -0.0006    -0.0018  -0.0006    -0.0017  -0.0006    -0.0015  -0.0005    -0.0010  -0.0003    0.0004  0.0001 
(0.0010)*  (0.0003)*    (0.0010)*  (0.0003)*    (0.0010)*  (0.0003)*    (0.0024)  (0.0008)    (0.0023)  (0.0008)    (0.0031)  (0.0011) 
Village head’s age in (t-1) period  0.0056  0.0019    0.0057  0.0019    0.0053  0.0018    0.0026  0.0009    0.0025  0.0009    0.0015  0.0006 
(0.0013)***  (0.0004)***    (0.0013)***  (0.0004)***    (0.0014)***  (0.0005)***    (0.0007)***  (0.0003)***    (0.0007)***  (0.0003)***    (0.0009)*  (0.0003)* 
Village head’s education in t-1 period                                   
  Not completed  -0.0527  -0.0172    -0.0566  -0.0184    -0.1040  -0.0337    0.1467  0.0536    0.1614  0.0592    0.0714  0.0262 
(0.1800)  (0.0578)    (0.1800)  (0.0577)    (0.1900)  (0.0591)    (0.0934)  (0.0355)    (0.0934)*  (0.0357)*    (0.1134)  (0.0438) 
  Primary school  0.0848  0.0285    0.0789  0.0265    0.0534  0.0180    0.1467  0.0531    0.1641  0.0595    0.0874  0.0320 
  (0.1700)  (0.0594)    (0.1700)  (0.0590)    (0.1800)  (0.0611)    (0.0934)  (0.0343)    (0.0934)*  (0.0345)*    (0.1134)  (0.0430) 
  Junior high school  0.2040  0.0693    0.1970  0.0671    0.1580  0.0540    0.1634  0.0585    0.1828  0.0655    0.1087  0.0398 
  (0.1800)  (0.0619)    (0.1800)  (0.0616)    (0.1800)  (0.0634)    (0.0934)*  (0.0336)*    (0.0934)**  (0.0337)*    (0.1134)  (0.0426) 
  High school  0.2180  0.0732    0.2120  0.0714    0.1720  0.0581    0.1874  0.0663    0.2028  0.0717    0.1081  0.0391 
  (0.1700)  (0.0595)    (0.1700)  (0.0594)    (0.1800)  (0.0614)    (0.0934)**  (0.0327)**    (0.0934)**  (0.0328)*    (0.1134)  (0.0416) 
  Academy  0.3580  0.1286    0.3540  0.1274    0.3050  0.1093    0.1694  0.0622    0.1794  0.0660    0.0854  0.0316 
  (0.1800)**  (0.0677)**    (0.1800)**  (0.0675)*    (0.1800)*  (0.0698)    (0.0934)*  (0.0363)*    (0.0934)*  (0.0366)**    (0.1134)  (0.0441) 
  University  0.3070  0.1093    0.3040  0.1082    0.2630  0.0932    0.1721  0.0631    0.1828  0.0670    0.1167  0.0433 
  (0.1800)*  (0.0659)*    (0.1800)*  (0.0658)*    (0.1800)  (0.0672)    (0.0934)*  (0.0358)*    (0.0934)*  (0.0361)*    (0.1134)  (0.0442) 
Village head’s duration in years  -0.0014  -0.0005    -0.0014  -0.0005    -0.0020  -0.0007    -0.0005  -0.0002    -0.0006  -0.0002    -0.0003  -0.0001 
(0.0018)  (0.0006)    (0.0018)  (0.0006)    (0.0019)  (0.0006)    (0.0013)  (0.0005)    (0.0013)  (0.0005)    (0.0015)  (0.0005) 
Villages with 50% or more families in 
pre-welfare and welfare 1 in (t-1) 
period: yes 1, no 0 
-0.0815  -0.0271    -0.0776  -0.0258    -0.0772  -0.0258    0.0055  0.0019    0.0024  0.0008    0.0033  0.0012 
(0.0240)***  (0.0082)***    (0.0240)***  (0.0079)***    (0.0250)***  (0.0085)***    (0.0133)  (0.0046)    (0.0127)  (0.0045)    (0.0153)  (0.0054) 
If the village had a junior high school 
in (t-1) period: yes 1, no 0 
2.8410  0.8427    2.8430  0.8429    2.8460  0.8436    1.6215  0.5169    1.6208  0.5167    1.6428  0.5211 
(0.0290)***  (0.0043)***    (0.0290)***  (0.0043)***    (0.0310)***  (0.0045)***    (0.0220)***  (0.0042)***    (0.0220)***  (0.0042)***    (0.0260)***  (0.0048)*** 
Mean distance in district in (t-1) period 
X initial condition x 100 
0.0012  0.0004    0.0025  0.0008    0.0007  0.0002    -0.0006  -0.0002    -0.0028  -0.0010    0.0045  0.0016 
(0.0032)  (0.0010)    (0.0036)  (0.0010)    (0.0033)  (0.0010)    (0.0023)  (0.0007)    (0.0023)  (0.0007)    (0.0041)  (0.0013) 
Population of village in (t-1) 
period X 10^4 
0.0560  0.0185    0.0557  0.0185    0.0543  0.0181    0.5449  0.1901    0.5589  0.1948    0.5496  0.1981 
(0.0240)**  (0.0001)**    (0.0240)**  (0.0001)**    (0.0240)**  (0.0001)*    (0.0520)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0520)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0580)***  (0.0001)*** 
If the village had any terminal/station/ 
port in (t-1) period: yes 1, no 0 
0.1850  0.0641    0.1890  0.0654    0.1840  0.0640    0.1234  0.0447  1  0.1101  0.0397    0.1054  0.0390 
(0.0370)***  (0.0135)***    (0.0370)***  (0.0134)***    (0.0380)***  (0.0140)***    (0.0233)***  (0.0088)***    (0.0240)***  (0.0090)***    (0.0273)***  (0.0104)*** 
Village topography (hill area 0, 
flatland 1) 
-0.0033  -0.0011    -0.0047  -0.0015    -0.0098  -0.0033    -0.0015  -0.0005    0.0073  0.0025    -0.0111  -0.0040 
(0.0260)  (0.0087)    (0.0260)  (0.0087)    (0.0270)  (0.0091)    (0.0173)  (0.0060)    (0.0167)  (0.0058)    (0.0207)  (0.0074) 
Any disaster in last three years: yes 1, 
no 2 
-0.0522  -0.0173    -0.0511  -0.0169    -0.0620  -0.0206    0.0187  0.0066    0.0204  0.0071    0.0072  0.0026 
(0.0240)***  (0.0079)**    (0.0240)**  (0.0079)    (0.0250)**  (0.0083)**    (0.0147)**  (0.0050)    (0.0133)  (0.0047)    (0.0173)  (0.0061) 
Annual GRDP growth x 100              0.1840  0.0614                -0.1261  -0.0454 
              (0.0460)***  (0.0150)***                (0.2134)  (0.0767) 
Fixed effects included  No      Yes      No      No      Yes      No   
Observations  49,850      49,850      49,850      55,129      55,129      55,129   
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. District-specific constants are not reported in the table. GRDP: gross 




Table 8a.  Local preference and changes in local public goods: Healthcare infrastructure (polyclinic) 
  Dependent variable: change in the availability of polyclinic in village 
  Estimation method: ordered probit 
  1996–2000    2000–2006 

























Village head’s gender in (t-1) period 
(male 1, female 0) 
-0.0905  -0.0030    -0.1170  -0.0005    -0.0409  -0.0021    -0.0532  -0.0030    -0.0464  -0.0007    -0.0625  -0.0038 
(0.0230)***  (0.0002)***    (0.0011)***  (0.0000)***    (0.0120)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0307)*  (0.0019)*    (0.0007)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0334)*  (0.0022)* 
Percent of women voters in 
village X 10^2 
-0.1550  -0.0047    -0.1572  -0.0006    -0.1620  -0.0049    -0.2535  -0.0133    -0.0045  -0.0006    -0.5950  -0.0334 
(0.0450)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0023)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0240)***  (0.0001)***    (0.2335)  (0.0120)    (0.0015)***  (0.0001)***    (0.2535)**  (0.0140)* 
Village head’s age in (t-1) period  0.0067  0.0002    0.0062  0.0002    0.0051  0.0002    0.0036  0.0002    0.0043  0.0006    0.0060  0.0003 
(0.0005)***  (0.0001)*    (0.0001)***  (0.0001)*    (0.0003)***  (0.0001)*    (0.0017)**  (0.0001)**    (0.0001)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0011)***  (0.0001)*** 
Village head’s education in (t-1) period                                   
  Not completed  -0.8060  -0.0109    -0.6037  -0.0010    0.3350  -0.0108    -0.2648  -0.0097    -0.0954  -0.0011    -0.2561  -0.0101 
(0.0120)***  (0.0041)***    (0.0021)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0074)***  (0.0042)**    (0.1267)**  (0.0033)**    (0.0010)***  (0.0001)***    (0.1734)  (0.0047)* 
  Primary school  -0.8380  -0.0172    -0.5731  -0.0014    0.3770  -0.0163    -0.1661  -0.0074    0.0129  0.0018    -0.1714  -0.0081 
  (0.0140)***  (0.0059)***    (0.0024)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0087)***  (0.0058)**    (0.1201)  (0.0047)    (0.0011)***  (0.0002)***    (0.1734)  (0.0067) 
  Junior high school  -0.7060  -0.0161    -0.4677  -0.0013    0.4210  -0.0150    -0.1554  -0.0074    0.0360  0.0005    -0.1294  -0.0067 
  (0.0160)***  (0.0054)***    (0.0024)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0086)***  (0.0051)**    (0.1267)  (0.0055)    (0.0013)***  (0.0001)***    (0.1734)  (0.0082) 
  High school  -0.6000  -0.0162    -0.3676  -0.0012    0.4930  -0.0150    -0.1127  -0.0058    0.0720  0.0010    -0.0800  -0.0044 
  (0.0160)***  (0.0051)***    (0.0025)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0091)***  (0.0049)**    (0.1267)  (0.0063)    (0.0013)***  (0.0000)***    (0.1734)  (0.0093) 
  Academy  -0.3500  -0.0074    -0.1167  -0.0004    0.6310  -0.0067    -0.0396  -0.0020    0.1661  0.0031    -0.0074  -0.0004 
  (0.0120)***  (0.0025)***    (0.0023)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0066)***  (0.0023)**    (0.1334)  (0.0061)    (0.0014)***  (0.0001)***    (0.1734)  (0.0096) 
  University  -0.3920  -0.0081    -0.2519  -0.0006    0.5100  -0.0075    -0.0707  -0.0034    0.1387  0.0024    -0.0236  -0.0013 
  (0.0140)***  (0.0028)***    (0.0020)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0068)***  (0.0026)**    (0.1267)  (0.0057)    (0.0017)***  (0.0001)***    (0.1734)  (0.0090) 
Village head’s duration in years  -0.0007  -0.0002    -0.0001  -0.0001    -0.0001  -0.0002    -0.0023  -0.0001    -0.0014  -0.0002    -0.0043  -0.0002 
(0.0018)  (0.0001)    (0.0001)  (0.0001)    (0.0010)  (0.0005)    (0.0023)  (0.0001)    (0.0001)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0023)*  (0.0001)* 
Villages with 50% or more families in 
pre-welfare and welfare 1 in (t-1) 
period: yes 1, no 0 
-0.3260  -0.0106    -0.3046  -0.0012    -0.0945  -0.0105    -0.1007  -0.0053    -0.1267  -0.0017    -0.1167  -0.0066 
(0.0170)***  (0.0030)***    (0.0011)***  (0.0000)***    (0.0094)***  (0.0030)***    (0.0260)***  (0.0015)***    (0.0005)***  (0.0003)***    (0.0280)***  (0.0018)*** 
If the village had a polyclinic in (t-1) 
period: yes 1, no 0 
-7.6600  -0.0266    -13.8217  -0.0069    -6.3100  -0.0272    -6.9635  -0.0491    -9.2246  -0.0212    -6.9501  -0.0559 
(0.0300)***  (0.0092)***    (0.0155)***  (0.0002)***    (0.0190)***  (0.0097)**    (0.4736)***  (0.0033)***    (0.0093)***  (0.0004)***    (0.4936)***  (0.0041)*** 
If the village had a puskesmas in (t-1) 
period: yes 1, no 0 
0.5810  0.0297    0.6037  0.0047    0.3630  0.0294    0.1694  0.0109    0.2321  0.0045    0.1848  0.0128 
(0.0170)***  (0.0102)***    (0.0019)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0083)***  (0.0104)**    (0.0227)***  (0.0019)***    (0.0021)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0240)***  (0.0023)*** 
Population of village in (t-1) 
period X 10^4 
0.0703  0.0021    0.0458  0.0006    0.0379  0.0021    0.6443  0.0339    0.4442  0.0060    0.5890  0.0331 
(0.0028)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0004)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0014)***  (0.0001)**    (0.0634)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0016)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0667)***  (0.0001)*** 
If the village had any terminal/station/ 
port in (t-1) period: yes 1, no 0 
0.3740  0.0163    0.4022  0.0025    0.3760  0.0162    0.1067  0.0065    0.1821  0.0034    0.0900  0.0057 
(0.0150)***  (0.0060)***    (0.0024)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0081)***  (0.0062)**    (0.0307)***  (0.0023)***    (0.0021)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0287)***  (0.0021)** 
Village topography (hill area 0, 
flatland 1) 
0.1600  0.0045    0.1658  0.0005    0.0306  0.0048    0.0552  0.0028    0.1141  0.0014    0.1014  0.0053 
(0.0210)***  (0.0021)***    (0.0010)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0110)***  (0.0023)*    (0.0327)*  (0.0016)*    (0.0007)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0313)***  (0.0017)** 
Any disaster in last three years: yes 1, 
no 2 
-0.0419  -0.0013    0.0476  0.0017    0.0058  -0.0011    -0.0175  -0.0009    0.0064  0.0009    -0.0047  -0.0003 
(0.0170)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0007)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0091)  (0.0001)***    (0.0200)  (0.0010)    (0.0006)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0220)  (0.0012) 
Annual GRDP growth x 100              -0.0008  -0.0025                0.6390  0.0359 
              (0.0028)  (0.0100)                (0.5203)  (0.0300) 
Fixed effects included  No      Yes      No      No      Yes      No   
Observations  52,127      52,127      52,127      55,129      55,129      55,129   
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. District-specific constants are not reported in the table. GRDP: gross 




Table 8b. Local preference and changes in local public goods: Healthcare infrastructure (puskesmas) 
  Dependent variable: change in the availability of puskesmas in village 
  Estimation method: ordered probit 
  1996–2000    2000–2006 

























Village head’s gender in (t-1) period 
(male 1, female 0) 
-0.0599  -0.0007    -0.0820  -0.0007    -0.0654  -0.0005    -0.0513  -0.0006    -0.0484  -0.0006    -0.0585  -0.0006 
(0.0120)***  (0.0000)***    (0.0010)***  (0.0000)***    (0.0240)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0093)***  (0.0000)***    (0.0087)***  (0.0000)***    (0.0107)***  (0.0001)*** 
Percent of women voters in 
village X 10^2 
0.1660  0.0019    0.1700  0.0018    0.1610  0.0018    -0.4909  -0.0054    -0.4215  -0.0046    -0.2628  -0.0024 
(0.0230)***  (0.0010)***    (0.0231)***  (0.0010)*    (0.0470)***  (0.0010)***    (0.0180)***  (0.0013)***    (0.0180)***  (0.0007)***    (0.0207)***  (0.0007)*** 
Village head’s age in (t-1) period  0.0054  0.0006    0.0051  0.0006    0.0068  0.0006    0.0032  0.0003    0.0032  0.0003    0.0023  0.0002 
(0.0003)***  (0.0002)***    (0.0001)***  (0.0002)***    (0.0005)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0002)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0002)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0002)***  (0.0001)** 
Village head’s education in (t-1) period                                   
  Not completed  0.2790  0.0046    0.2756  0.0047    -0.7940  0.0058    -0.0171  -0.0018    0.0101  0.0001    0.0650  0.0007 
(0.0069)***  (0.0010)***    (0.0015)***  (0.0012)***    (0.0130)***  (0.0013)***    (0.0051)***  (0.0002)***    (0.0050)**  (0.0001)**    (0.0057)***  (0.0003)*** 
  Primary school  0.3290  0.0048    0.3620  0.0050    -0.7870  0.0056    0.0056  0.0001    0.0393  0.0005    0.0516  0.0005 
  (0.0083)***  (0.0011)***    (0.0020)***  (0.0013)***    (0.0150)***  (0.0013)***    (0.0061)  (0.0001)    (0.0061)***  (0.0002)***    (0.0062)***  (0.0002)** 
  Junior high school  0.3680  0.0054    0.4192  0.0056    -0.6480  0.0063    0.0169  0.0002    0.0583  0.0007    0.0637  0.0006 
  (0.0082)***  (0.0012)***    (0.0023)***  (0.0014)***    (0.0160)***  (0.0014)***    (0.0065)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0063)***  (0.0002)***    (0.0080)***  (0.0003)** 
  High school  0.4430  0.0061    0.5082  0.0063    -0.5490  0.0068    0.0601  0.0007    0.0980  0.0011    0.1227  0.0012 
  (0.0087)***  (0.0013)***    (0.0023)***  (0.0016)***    (0.0170)***  (0.0015)***    (0.0063)***  (0.0002)***    (0.0061)***  (0.0004)***    (0.0073)***  (0.0004)** 
  Academy  0.5920  0.0143    0.6579  0.0147    -0.3020  0.0157    0.0934  0.0012    0.1254  0.0017    0.1574  0.0019 
  (0.0064)***  (0.0028)***    (0.0020)***  (0.0033)***    (0.0130)***  (0.0032)***    (0.0053)***  (0.0004)***    (0.0051)***  (0.0005)***    (0.0063)***  (0.0007)*** 
  University  0.4640  0.0094    0.5219  0.0097    -0.3480  0.0107    0.0974  0.0013    0.1307  0.0018    0.1688  0.0020 
  (0.0065)***  (0.0019)***    (0.0025)***  (0.0023)***    (0.0140)***  (0.0023)**    (0.0061)***  (0.0004)***    (0.0060)***  (0.0005)***    (0.0073)***  (0.0007)*** 
Village head’s duration in years x 100  0.0482  0.0005    0.2100  0.0006    -0.0727  -0.0001    0.0018  0.0002    -0.0321  -0.0004    0.0021  0.0002 
(0.0940)  (0.0010)    (0.0100)***  (0.0001)    (0.1900)  (0.0010)    (0.0667)  (0.0007)    (0.0667)  (0.0007)    (0.0008)**  (0.0001) 
Villages with 50% or more families in 
pre-welfare and welfare 1 in (t-1) 
period: yes 1, no 0 
-0.0979  -0.0011    -0.1270  -0.0012    -0.3240  -0.0011    -0.0413  -0.0005    -0.0462  -0.0005    -0.0289  -0.0003 
(0.0090)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0007)***  (0.0002)***    (0.0170)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0065)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0064)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0073)***  (0.0000)*** 
If the village had a puskesmas in (t-1) 
period: yes 1, no 0 
-6.3060  -0.0257    -11.0578  -0.0257    -7.7210  -0.0255    -4.2568  -0.0173    -4.2741  -0.0172    -4.2988  -0.0159 
(0.0180)***  (0.0045)***    (0.0124)***  (0.0052)***    (0.0300)***  (0.0047)***    (0.0113)***  (0.0035)***    (0.0113)***  (0.0038)***    (0.0147)***  (0.0042)*** 
If the village had a polyclinic in (t-1) 
period: yes 1, no 0 
0.3400  0.0059    0.2839  0.0060    0.5770  0.0064    0.0874  0.0011    0.0887  0.0011    0.0794  0.0008 
(0.0080)***  (0.0013)***    (0.0027)***  (0.0015)***    (0.0170)***  (0.0015)***    (0.0073)***  (0.0004)***    (0.0067)***  (0.0004)***    (0.0087)***  (0.0003)** 
Population of village in (t-1) 
period X 10^4 
0.0392  0.0004    0.0392  0.0004    0.0683  0.0004    0.2208  0.0024    0.2308  0.0025    0.2555  0.0023 
(0.0014)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0014)***  (0.0000)***    (0.0028)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0087)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0087)***  (0.0002)***    (0.0100)***  (0.0001)*** 
If the village had any terminal/station/ 
port in (t-1) period: yes 1, no 0 
0.3660  0.0064    0.3673  0.0063    0.3720  0.0066    0.1834  0.0028    0.1681  0.0025    0.1554  0.0019 
(0.0078)***  (0.0014)***    (0.0021)***  (0.0016)***    (0.0160)***  (0.0015)***    (0.0065)***  (0.0008)***    (0.0063)***  (0.0007)***    (0.0080)***  (0.0007)*** 
Village topography (hill area 0, 
flatland 1) 
0.0329  0.0004    0.0442  0.0004    0.1730  0.0003    0.0140  0.0002    0.0249  0.0003    0.0242  0.0002 
(0.0100)***  (0.0002)***    (0.0009)***  (0.0002)*    (0.0210)***  (0.0002)*    (0.0080)*  (0.0001)    (0.0073)***  (0.0001)*    (0.0093)***  (0.0001)*** 
Any disaster in last three years: yes 1, 
no 2 
0.0124  0.0001    0.0061  0.0001    -0.0360  0.0001    0.0282  0.0003    0.0296  0.0003    0.0337  0.0003 
(0.0088)  (0.0001)    (0.0006)***  (0.0001)    (0.0170)  (0.0001)    (0.0065)***  (0.0001)***    (0.0063)***  (0.0002)**    (0.0073)***  (0.0002)*** 
Annual GRDP growth x 100              -0.0830  -0.0008                -0.1974  -0.0018 
              (0.0032)***  (0.0001)***                (0.0587)***  (0.0001)*** 
Fixed effects included  No      Yes      No      No      Yes      No   
Observations  49,850      49,850      49,850      55,082      55,082      55,082   
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * Significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. District-specific constants are not reported in the table. GRDP: gross 





We herein examine the impact of the recent governmental decentralization in Indonesia on local 
infrastructure provision, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and initial conditions. The 
decentralization of decisionmaking powers to local authorities in Indonesia has made local public 
infrastructures dependent on local government jurisdictions. The preexistence of horizontal inequality 
among local government jurisdictions allows for the possibility of divergence in local public good 
provision. In addition, decentralization allows local preferences to influence local public goods provision. 
If, for instance, women as a group prefer one particular public good over other alternatives, the preferred 
good may be more likely to receive financing under post-decentralization.  
To model the dynamics of public goods provision, we make public goods state-dependent by 
conditioning the supply of public goods in period t on the lagged public goods stocks in period (t - 1). The 
availability of pre- and post-decentralization period data at the level of local government jurisdictions 
facilitates this empirical exercise. In addition, the availability of information on desa-level income 
indicators and the relevant characteristics of the desa administrators and voters allows us to account for 
local-level resources and preferences.  
The empirical findings of this paper support the notion that decentralization has linked local 
public goods to local income, in that the availability of local roads, schools, and healthcare facilities at the 
desa level depends on local income. Despite the transfer of grants from the central government to the 
district governments following decentralization, local public goods still depend on local resource 
availability, and poorer localities have fewer public goods than richer localities. This finding remains 
valid even after we control for district-fixed effects.  
Contrary to our expectations, decentralization in Indonesia appears to have improved the 
availability of local public goods across rich and poor localities. Although there are cross-jurisdictional 
differences, the examined measures appear to be converging to similar levels of access to local public 
goods. This may be due to the interjurisdictional competition and efficiency gains that economists have 
long argued should occur in decentralized states, the increased accountability of government bureaucrats, 
and/or decreases in capture by local elites. 
Given resource availability, the supply of some of the public goods considered herein also 
depends on local preferences. We find that female desa heads and female voters have a strong preference 
for local road improvements. However, the preferences are less clear for educational and healthcare 
infrastructures; there might be spillover, coordination, and free-riding problems that future studies need to 
account for.  
Our results in the context of the Indonesian experience suggest that the decentralization and 
democratization trends currently being observed in many developing countries may be viewed with 
cautious optimism. The devolution of decisionmaking power and local public goods delivery to local 
government jurisdictions can enhance efficiency and match local preferences compared to provision 
through a centralized system. However, for some public goods (for example, education and healthcare), 
local authorities may not have sufficient capacity and/or may require interjurisdictional coordination to 
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